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Abstract
Labour market reforms that are designed to stimulate labour supply at the
lower end of the wage distribution can never be precisely restricted to the
target group. Spillovers to and feedback from other segments of the labour
market are unavoidable and may counteract the direct e¤ects of the reform.
An adequate representation of heterogeneous labour markets becomes there-
fore an important issue for the assessment of reforms. We analyse the pos-
sible interactions between labour market segments in a combined, consistent
microsimulation-AGE model with a exible representation of substitution pos-
sibilities and di¤erent mechanisms of wage determination. We look at a styl-
ised reform and nd labour-demand cross-price elasticities between the low
and medium skilled to be the main drivers of the results. Interaction with the
high-skilled segment is less pronounced.
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Non-technical summary
We explore the consequences of implementing heterogeneous labour markets in a
consistently linked micro-macro model used to analyse tax and transfer reforms.
Three skill types of labour are distinguished, which are imperfect substitutes in
the production process. They are implemented in a set-up that uses non-separable,
nested CES functions in order to allow for an unrestricted matrix of elasticities
of substitution within the production function. We combine wage bargaining for
the low and medium skilled with a perfectly competitive labour market for the
high skilled. Both the exible substitution structure and the heterogeneity in labour
market institutions play a role in the results, but labour demand elasticities turn
out to be the most important drivers.
We use the model to simulate a reform of the German transfer system that stim-
ulates labour supply at the lower end of the wage distribution by combining lower
basic social assistance payments and a lower transfer withdrawal rate. Qualitatively,
the results are fairly robust. In all model variants considered, participation e¤ects
are positive and considerably large. They are most pronounced for singles; spouses
in couples are less a¤ected. By contrast, the e¤ects on the average working time are
small, so that changes in overall labour supply are dominated by the participation
response.
In general equilibrium, wages fall for all skill groups, but most signicantly for
the low skilled. This produces feedback and dampens labour supply reactions com-
pared to a partial analysis. Due to relatively low labour demand elasticities, wage
drops translate into a lower share of labour, which in turn produces a switch from
consumption to investment in the spending pattern. Although GDP increases by
more than one percent, the welfare reform, in isolation, is not self-nancing because
the shift in functional income distribution causes considerable tax revenue losses.
The consequences of the switch from wage bargaining to competitive wage for-
mation for the high skilled are concentrated on this very skill group. In a competitive
labour market setting, the wage-reducing e¤ects of higher tax progressivity and a
deterioration of the fallback position of trade unions are absent. Therefore wage
drops are less pronounced and employment gains are lower compared with collective
wage bargaining.
1 Introduction
Many European countries are engaged in a continuous process of reforming their
labour market institutions and the tax and welfare system. The EU countries even
committed themselves to explicit labour force participation targets in the context of
the Lisbon strategy(Gelau¤ and Lejour, 2006). Labour market reforms particu-
larly focus on the low-skilled segment of labour supply and demand (for an overview
see Orsini, 2005). This segment is crucial for the overall labour market performance
because it has the highest unemployment rates and participation is below average. At
the same time we observe particularly di¢ cult conditions for employment gains here
because negative demand e¤ects from skill-biased technological change and shifting
world trade patterns are further complicated by supply disincentives resulting from
the tax and transfer schemes. The situation is often described as a poverty trap,
caused by the small (or even negative) di¤erence between the welfare benets for the
non-employed and net earnings at low wage levels, and a high transfer withdrawal
rate.
Concrete policy proposals that aim at an amelioration of this situation face two
main di¢ culties. First, those who are not able to work cannot compensate reductions
in the welfare payments by more intense search on the labour market. For this group
income losses are considered to be unacceptable. Second, lower transfer withdrawal
rates lead to windfall prots for those workers who are in the respective income
bracket and already active in the labour market. These windfall prots and the
ensuing tax revenue losses can be large enough to render the reforms infeasible from
a public budget point of view. Due to this latter problem we cannot restrict ourselves
to the low-skilled segment if we engage in an ex-ante evaluation of labour market
reforms. The other segments must be taken into account as well, and the way we
model the labour markets for the high skilled can make a di¤erence for the overall
assessment of concrete reform proposals.
In general, the analysis of encompassing labour market reforms requires a model
that includes the most important micro and macro features of the labour market.
We think that this can only be achieved in a convincing way if we choose a micro-
macro approach that combines microsimulation and general equilibrium feedback
mechanisms. In particular, we take PACE-L, an applied general equilibrium (AGE)
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model with labour market focus as our point of departure and add a microsimulation
module based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) with about 3000
households. (See Arntz et al., 2008, for a more comprehensive discussion of this
approach.)
Such an integrated approach can be contrasted with pure microsimulation stud-
ies on the one hand and pure AGE models on the other. The usual labour market
application of microsimulation (for an overview see Gupta and Kapur, 2000) com-
bines individual micro data with a discrete labour supply decision modelled in the
tradition of van Soest (1995). In most cases, however, this approach remains conned
to the micro level and cannot address the macro issues of endogenously adjusting
wages, unemployment and the public budget.1 If we approach the analysis from the
macro end, we deal with models in the AGE tradition (Shoven and Whalley, 1984)
that combine a standard AGE setup with a somewhat more detailed labour market
module (Hutton and Ruocco, 1999; Graaand et al., 2001; Böhringer et al., 2005).
A common problem in this setup is the distinction between the intensive and ex-
tensive margin of labour supply. Even if this problem is solved in principle, as in
Graaand et al. (2001), the model reacts sensitively to the structural assumptions
of the calibration procedure (Arntz et al., 2006).
Examples of a full micro-macro linkage in applied labour market research are
rare. Two exceptions are Müller (2004) and Aaberge et al. (2004), but the focus of
those studies is considerably di¤erent from ours. Müller (2004) simulates versions of
a basic income in Switzerland, and Aaberge et al. (2004) analyse the scal conse-
quences of ageing in the presence of an adjusting labour market in Norway. In the
eld of international trade and development economics, in contrast, the integrated
micro-macro approach is more established (Bourguignon et al., 2005; Cororaton and
Cockburn, 2007; Rutherford et al., 2005). An important di¤erence between analysis
of trade policy and labour market reforms should be noted. In the trade literature the
initial shock is on the macro level (trade regime shifts), and the micro consequences
are analysed (income of individual households). By contrast, in the labour market
analysis of our paper, the initial shock is at the micro level, and macro variables
(wage and unemployment reactions) are among the outcomes of interest.
1A recent example for Germany that does take involuntary unemployment into account is
Bargain et al. (2005).
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In our simulation exercises, we study the interaction among heterogeneous labour
markets in the context of a reform that is targeted at the low-income segment. In
particular, we simulate a reform that increases labour supply incentives by a simul-
taneous reduction of benets and transfer withdrawal rates for low wage incomes.
We explore to what extent and through which mechanisms the representation of the
markets for skills and the formulation of the production structure matter in such
a setting. This includes a departure from our previous approach2 (Böhringer et al.,
2005, Arntz et al., 2008): We split labour into three instead of two skill groups, which
together with physical capital and intermediate inputs are combined in a exible pro-
duction function. In addition, we model the labour market for high-skilled workers
as perfectly competitive while remaining with the wage-bargaining formulation for
the medium and low skilled.
Working with three types of labour has the advantage that we can calibrate our
model to estimates based on the same decomposition of labour, which has become
standard in empirical work (e.g. Fitzenberger, 1999, or Falk and Koebel, 2001).
Switching from a two-level nested CES production function to a exible functional
form is in line with the econometrics of factor demand, where functions such as
Translog or Diewert are typically used. In addition, a separate labour market for the
high skilled gives us leeway to exclude them from collective bargaining. Our simula-
tion results show that both the implementation of empirically founded substitution
patterns between the di¤erent skill groups and the labour market institutions for the
high skilled a¤ect the macroeconomic outcomes of the reform. In terms of quantita-
tive signicance, the most action is in the interaction between the low and medium
skilled labour market segment. The repercussions from the high-skilled segment are
less pronounced, because the relevant cross-price elasticities are low. This is also
the reason that the choice of the labour-market regime for the high skilled has only
small spillover e¤ects to the other labour market segments.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the two building blocks of the model  the discrete choice labour supply module
2An application of this approach to recent labour market reforms in Germany can be found in
Franz et al. (2007). That study places special focus on a precise representation of the current tax
and transfer schedule, whereas in our paper, we remain with a stylised version to make a more
methodological point.
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and the AGE framework and our way of linking them. Section 3 describes our
implementation of the three skill groups and heterogeneous labour market institu-
tions, i.e. those model parts that go beyond Arntz et al. (2008). Section 4 reports
the results of the comparative scenario analysis. To put the results in perspective,
we compare the main model version with a partial labour supply model and with a
uniform wage-bargaining regime for all skill groups. Section 5 provides further sen-
sitivity analysis with respect to the labour demand calibration and capital mobility.
In Section 6, we draw conclusions and sum up. An appendix provides additional
information about the estimation results of the discrete-choice model, the German
tax and transfer system and the labour demand calibration.
2 The modules of the model
We analyse labour market reforms in an integrated micro-macro model. The micro
module consists of a discrete choice (DC) labour supply set-up for heterogeneous
households. The macro module is made up of a multi-sectoral AGE model of an
open economy with wage bargaining. In this section, we present the two modules
individually, and then discuss the links between them, which produce consistent
feedback loops. A more extensive discussion of the micro-macro set-up can be found
in Arntz et al. (2008).
2.1 Labour supply: a logit discrete-choice approach
The labour supply analysis in our model is based on the microsimulation model for
Germany by Buslei and Steiner (1999). This model combines a calculator for the
household income under the current German tax and transfer system (see Appendix
A.3) with a DC labour supply estimation of the van Soest (1995) type. Using in-
formation from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we construct labour
supply options (which combine the respective amounts of income and leisure) for
all households: For married males, there are three labour supply options, whereas
for all other individuals (married women, single females and single males) there are
ve. This corresponds to the empirical distribution of labour supply behaviour. The
options are summarised in Table 9 in the appendix.
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According to the DC setup, the utility of each option is a combination of a
deterministic part, U; that depends on a vector of individual and alternative-specic
characteristics, xj;k; and an additive stochastic term. For household j of type i we
then have
Ui(xj;k) = Ui(xj;k) + "j;k:
The distinctive feature of the logit approach is that the error term, "j;k; is assumed to
be independently standard extreme-value distributed. Under this assumption there
is an explicit formula for the probability of preferring option k over all other options
l 6= k from a set m (McFadden, 1974):
P (Ui(xj;k) > Ui(xj;l)) =
exp( Ui(xj;k))P
m
exp( Ui(xj;m))
; 8l 6= k
In our specication, the argument vector, xj;k; of the deterministic part of the utility
function, Ui; includes the logs of disposable income and weekly hours of leisure for
men and women:
xj;k = (log(Ci(h
f
j;k; h
m
j;k)); log(T   hfj;k); log(T   hmj;k));
where hf and hm are the working time of the spouses and T is time endowment. We
follow van Soest (1995) in assuming a quadratic utility function with Ai and i as
parameters that capture the quadratic and linear terms:
Ui(xj;k) = x
0
j;kAixj;k + 
0
ixj;k:
The parameters include interactions between leisure, income and a number of house-
hold characteristics (age, dummy for citizenship, East Germany, handicaps and chil-
dren in certain age brackets). These interactions account for di¤erences in the pref-
erences of households for particular hours-of-work options. In addition, we capture
xed costs of working by constant terms: For singles we include a constant for all
positive hours categories; for couples, there are two constants, one for positive work-
ing hours on the part of the woman, the other for both spouses working. We estimate
the coe¢ cients separately for couples, female singles and male singles. A complete
list of regressors and the detailed estimation results can be found in Appendix A.2.
Given the individual parameters of the utility functions and the disposable in-
comes for the pre and post-reform situations, we can proceed with simulating labour
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supply reactions to policy changes. Inserting disposable incomes in the utility func-
tion, we arrive at positive probabilities for each labour supply option. We implement
a simulation method proposed by Duncan and Weeks (1998, see also Creedy and
Kalb, 2005), which exploits the fact that we have information about the choices of
households in the initial situation. This can be used to transform the utility evalua-
tions of disposable income into conditional probabilities. We draw random numbers
from the extreme-value distribution, and retain only those that are consistent with
the actual choice of the respective household. In the subsequent simulation, with
changed disposable incomes for the di¤erent labour supply options, the optimal
choice will change for a subset of these random numbers. In the initial situation,
each household chooses exactly one option, whereas in the post-reform situation, we
end up with a genuine probability distribution over all options.
2.2 The AGE framework
The labour supply module is embedded in an applied general equilibrium model
of Germany (PACE-L). In this section, we only sketch the general parts of the
model. The wage determination module of PACE-L is singled out in Section 3.2. An
extensive, algebraic model description and a summary of the data sources used for
calibration can be found in Böhringer et al. (2005).3
Firms
In each of seven aggregate production sectors, a representative rm produces a
homogeneous output. The production function is of the nested constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) type, combining intermediate inputs, capital and labour of
the three skill types (for details, see Section 3.1). Each individual rm is assumed to
be small in relation to its respective sector. All rms in one sector interact through
monopolistic competition, so that rms can exploit market power in their individual
market segment. Cost minimisation yields demand functions for the primary fac-
tors at the sectoral level and corresponding uncompensated (own and cross) price
elasticities for labour. Capital is mobile across sectors, and the market for capital is
perfectly competitive. In the simulations in Section 4, we additionally assume that
3An updated, complete model description, which includes the changes implemented for this
paper, is available upon request.
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capital is internationally immobile, which reects a short- to medium-run model
horizon.
Private households
We distinguish about 3000 individual worker households with exible labour supply,
one residual worker household with xed labour supply, and a capitalist household.
The households captured by the microsimulation model include all households with
exible time allocation and observable hours of work, which is about 60% of total
labour supply. Pensioners, students, women on maternity leave, civil servants and
the self-employed are excluded from the microsimulation model. In the general equi-
librium model, they are represented by the residual household. At the same time,
the residual household makes up for the di¤erence in structure between the micro
data set and the national accounts. The capitalist household receives all capital and
prot income. Capitalists decide over consumption and investment according to the
approach of Ballard et al. (1985). Their utility function is calibrated to empirical
saving elasticities. Worker households, by contrast, do not save. The structure of con-
sumption is assumed to be identical across all households. Aggregate consumption
is distributed among 12 di¤erent consumption goods according to a CES function.
Government
The main focus of the model in this paper is on the complex tax and transfer
system for private households, whose budget constraints are calculated in a special
programme module (see Appendix A.3). Apart from taxes and transfers for private
households, the government collects a uniform capital input tax, a prot tax, an
output tax in production and a di¤erentiated consumption tax. The government
budget contains the revenue from all these taxes, the public purchases of goods,
and the balance of payments surplus or decit. The income tax (on labour and
domestic capital income) includes an endogenous mark-up that is adjusted so that
counterfactual scenarios are made revenue-neutral.
Foreign Trade
Domestically produced goods are converted into specic goods destined for the do-
mestic market and the export market through a constant-elasticity-of-transformation
function. According to the small-open-economy assumption, export and import
prices in foreign currency are not a¤ected by the behaviour of the domestic econ-
omy. Analogously to the export side, we adopt the Armington assumption of product
7
heterogeneity for the import side. A CES function characterises the choice between
imported and domestically produced varieties of the same good. The Armington
good enters intermediate and nal demand. Foreign closure of the model is war-
ranted through the balance-of-payments constraint.
2.3 Linking the microsimulation and AGE modules
If we had a closed-form formula for individual labour supply, it would in principle
be possible to integrate all the equations of the two modules in a single model and
try to solve it simultaneously.4 However, as we simulate labour supply with random
numbers (see Section 2.1), we have no such closed-form expression. This leaves us
only with the option of keeping the modules separate and iterating them until they
produce a consistent solution. In policy simulations, such as those in Section 4, we
start with the modied rules of the tax and transfer system and rst simulate labour
supply changes under the assumption of constant wages and unemployment rates.
The resulting labour supply is aggregated (by skill type) and transferred to the AGE
model, which is solved under the assumption of a xed labour supply. This results in
changes in wages and unemployment rates, which are fed back to the labour supply
module for the next iteration. This proceeds until the two model modules converge.5
Three aspects of the linkage set-up deserve a closer look. First, in aggregating
labour supply, we use e¢ ciency weighting. That is, labour supply in hours is weighted
by the respective wage rate of the initial situation. It is assumed that all individual
wage rates (within a skill group) move in parallel, so adjustment of the weights during
the iterations is not an issue. E¢ ciency weighting corresponds to the assumption that
all labour of the same skill type is perfectly substitutable, except for the e¢ ciency
factor derived from the empirical wages.
Second, when we move from the AGE module to the labour supply module,
individual unemployment rates need to be adjusted. Unemployment probabilities
4Whether such a large model would actually be numerically solvable is another question.
5As a stopping criterion, we use a change in the unemployment rate between two subsequent
iterations of less than 10e-5. Usually, the model converges to this precision within less than ten
iterations. Remarkably, the convergence in aggregate labour supply is very fast, while unemploy-
ment rates are more volatile, showing oscillating convergence and overshooting their nal value in
the rst iteration by about 100 per cent.
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di¤er by household type (42 household types di¤erentiated by household composition
and skill level), but are equal within each household type. As the relative labour
supply of the household types changes during the iterations of the model, a change
in the overall unemployment rate (as an output of the AGE module) does not
simply translate into the same proportional changes in all individual unemployment
rates. An adjustment factor must be numerically determined. This is done in every
iteration step at the transition from the AGE to the labour supply module.
Third, in the AGE model with constant labour supply, an assumption is required
about the taxation of income changes that are caused by the endogenously adjusting
wage. As the individual tax rates are not available in the AGE model, we leave these
income changes untaxed in the intermediate iterations of the model. The exact split
into after-tax income and tax revenue is determined only in the next run of the
labour supply module.
3 Implementing three skill groups in theMS-AGE
model
3.1 Production structure: NNCES implementation
Earlier versions of PACE-L (Böhringer et al., 2005, Arntz et al., 2008) work with a
conventional separable nested CES function to represent production. Value added is
split into low-skilled labour and an aggregate of high-skilled labour and capital in a
rst stage. In a second stage, capital and high-skilled labour are separated. Such a
set-up can account for stylised patterns of substitution elasticities, in particular the
well known capital-skill complementarity (Fallon and Layard, 1975), but it is not
exible enough to represent full matrices of estimated cross price elasticities.
Restrictions through a structure of nested separable CES functions become the
more severe the more input factors we discriminate. If we extended the structure
of Böhringer et al. (2005) and split up high-skilled labour in a medium and a high-
skilled component, we would end up with four free parameters (elasticities of sub-
stitution at various levels of the production tree) to be calibrated. However, a fully
exible structure, such as the one estimated by Falk and Koebel (1997), features at
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Figure 1: NNCES set-up of production function
Sectoral output
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least 10 independent elasticities of substitution: a 5  5 matrix where 10 elements
are mirror images of the opposite side and 5 elements are linearly dependent on the
other entries in the same row or column.
The NNCES (non-separable, nested CES) approach to production function cal-
ibration (Pollak and Wales, 1987, Perroni and Rutherford, 1995, 1998) increases
the exibility of the nested CES framework through an extension to more generic
forms. Other exible forms known from econometric tradition (Translog or Diew-
ert) can locally represent arbitrary production or cost functions as well, but they
typically do not exhibit global regularity (the corresponding cost function must be
non-decreasing and concave in prices). This can cause computational problems in
AGE models (Perroni and Rutherford, 1995).
The basic idea behind the NNCES function is that each factor of production
can enter the production function at more than one single place (therefore non-
separable). A typical set-up can be seen in Figure 1: Sectoral output is decomposed
into ve sub-nests, each of which then in turn contains input from all factors: in-
termediate inputs (I), the three skill types (L, M, H) and capital (K).
Flexibility is increased not only by a larger number of elasticity parameters (six),
but also because the split of each production factor into the individual sub-nests
can be chosen freely.
Actually, the problem is now the other way around. Instead of too few para-
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meters, we now have too many. We face the ten exogenous elasticities with 26 free
parameters at hand (six elasticities and four free share parameters for each factor).
To resolve the resulting indeterminacy, it has been proposed to restrict certain elas-
ticities to zero or one (Pollak and Wales, 1987) or to add a penalty function. We
follow a suggestion by Rutherford and penalise dispersion of input factors across
several nests as well as large values of the elasticities of substitution. The approach
can be expressed algebraically as follows:
max
X
n;i
 
in
2   (Y )2  X
n
(n)
2
s.t. ij=
Y
j = Y +
X
n
(n   Y ) 
i
n
j
n
Yn
Yn =
X
i
Yi 
i
n
1 =
X
n
in
where i and j are indexes for the factors of production and n is an index for the
nests at the intermediate level (Nest 1etc. in Figure 1). The in are the shares of
the individual nests in the total amount of factor i, Yn is the share of the respective
nest in total sectoral output. The own and cross price elasticities, ij; as well as the
aggregate value shares, Yi ; are exogenous to the calibration. Y ; the ns and the
ins must be determined by minimising the penalty function. Appendix A.4 gives
the details of the labour demand elasticities, ij, to be calibrated and an example
of the calibration results in one sector.
3.2 Competitive labour markets vs. collective wage bargain-
ing
We choose a exible, parametric set-up for the model, which allows us to choose
between a competitive labour market and sectoral wage bargaining separately for
each skill group. Our default setting for the simulations in Section 4 is wage bar-
gaining for the low and medium skilled and a competitive labour market for the
high skilled. In the latter case labour market equations are straightforward. The
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competitive wage does the job of equalising supply and demand. Wage bargaining,
in contrast, requires a more in-depth explanation.
In the wage bargaining regime, wages are determined by sector and skill group
specic negotiations between an employersassociation and a trade union. The bar-
gaining outcome is generated through the maximisation of a Nash function, which
includes the objective functions of both parties and their respective fallback options.
We adopt the right to manageapproach: Parties bargain over wages, and rms
determine labour demand on the basis of the bargained wage. On the part of the
trade unions, we choose an insider objective function: value of a job minus the
value of the outside option. The latter in turn is composed of two components, asso-
ciated with the chances of nding a job in another sector or remaining unemployed.
The values of labour market states are recursively determined as weighted averages
of incomes in the case of employment and unemployment, where weights are com-
puted from the transition probabilities between employment and unemployment (see
Pissarides, 1990, for an overview of the search-and-matching approach).
When linking the wage bargaining equations to the microsimulation module, we
assume that all individual households are uniformly represented by the trade union.
Marginal tax rates and the values of employment and unemployment are calculated
as (hours-weighted) averages over all households and labour supply options of the
respective skill group. In turn, the wage that results from bargaining in general equi-
librium is used to derive the income positions of all households in all possible labour
market states. Here, we use the numerically approximated values of the marginal
e¤ective tax rate (see Appendix A.3). The three labour markets are balanced by ag-
gregating on the demand side over sectors and on the supply side over households of
the respective type. We assume that, with respect to households types, the structure
of labour demand is uniform across sectors.
In the wage-bargaining regime, wages respond to reforms in the tax and transfer
system through two di¤erent channels. First, the reforms change the marginal burden
of the total tax and transfer system (either through an explicit change of tax rates
or through lower transfer withdrawal rates). This bears on the bargaining outcome
through the average skill-specic e¤ective marginal tax rates. However, the e¤ect of
a specic reform on the average marginal tax rate is in most cases not clear a priori
because the marginal burden increases for some individuals while it decreases for
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others. As a benchmark, we know that with a constant average tax rate, an increase
in the e¤ective marginal tax rate raises the degree of tax progression, which leads to
wage moderation on the part of the unions (Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996). Second,
reforms of the transfer system reduce expected income when being unemployed (and
thus the fall-back position of unions) in two ways: directly through lower transfer
payments and if they succeed in stimulating labour supply indirectly through a
higher probability of unemployment (at given labour demand). This puts additional
pressure on wages.
4 Policy simulations: welfare reform with hetero-
geneous labour markets
We now apply the model described in Sections 2 and 3 in order to simulate a social
welfare reform that is designed to stimulate labour market participation of low-
income workers. We rst explain the before and after-reform situations and then
simulate the labour market e¤ects of the reform in di¤erent model versions. We are
mainly interested in the version including three skill types and heterogeneous labour
markets. However, to put the results into perspective, we complement this version
with two variants: (1) a partial equilibrium model, which isolates the labour supply
e¤ects and allows us to identify the extent of the general equilibrium feedback, and
(2) a version where we have wage bargaining on all labour markets, which highlights
the e¤ects of the labour market institutions for the high skilled.
4.1 Status-quo system and reform scenario
Germanys welfare system is particularly suited for our demonstration purposes
since it produces strong labour market disincentives of the type we discussed in the
introduction.6 The benet level is widely considered too generous from an incentive
6In 2005 the German social benet system underwent a considerable change through the so-
called "Hartz IV" reform. Work-related and work-independent benets were combined into one
benet, the basic job seekers allowance (Unemployment Benet II). The disincentives at the lower
end of the labour market were not changed much through this reform (Franz et al., 2007). Therefore,
we remain with the institutional setting and the terminology of the pre-Hartz situation.
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point of view, and transfer withdrawal results in e¤ective marginal tax rates that
are close to 100 per cent at the bottom of the income distribution.
Figure 2: Income function of a single without children
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Fig. 1: Income function of a single without children
30 hours
15 hours
Gross monthly earnings
Reform Scenario
Status Quo
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between gross and net monthly labour earn-
ings as well as disposable income for a single person without children. Disposable
income in the pre-reform situation (curve Status Quo) starts at e 600, which is
the social assistance level for this household type. Benets are phased out at a rate
of approximately 80 per cent up to the break even income, where eligibility ends.7
Reform scenario
In our reform scenario, we fully abolish the basic social assistance rate for those
welfare recipients who are considered to be able to work. Excepted from this re-
quirement to work are individuals with more than one child (single parents and one
of the spouses in couple households). To illustrate the reform scenario, the dashed
line in Figure 2 (Reform Scenario) depicts the new budget constraint for a single
person without children. Here, benets are cut by 50 per cent (from roughly e 600
to e 300) and the transfer withdrawal rate is reduced to zero up to the net earnings
715and 30 hoursin Figure 2 refer to a weekly labour supply of a worker with a gross hourly
wage of e 10.8, which is the mean over all low-skilled individuals.
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level that is necessary to reach status-quo social assistance. In the example of Fig-
ure 2, the individual may now earn e 300 net labour income that is not withdrawn.
Net earnings in excess of this amount are subject to a transfer withdrawal rate of
50 per cent up to the break even income where net income corresponds exactly to
disposable income. In Figure 2, eligibility for social assistance extends up to net
earnings of e 900. Through the reform all positive working time categories become
more attractive compared to non-participation due to the substantial reduction in
the benet level. In addition, the lower transfer-withdrawal rate may lead to a par-
ticular rise in disposable income for the lower working time categories. If this is the
case, taking up a part-time job gains in attractiveness compared to a full-time job.
The transfer withdrawal rate for single individuals that are considered non-
employable remains the same as in the status-quo system, whereas for employable
partners of non-employable persons in couple households it is lowered in the same
way as for singles. For couple households with more than one child, benet eligibil-
ity extends to considerably higher net earnings levels, e.g. with two children from
e 1327 in the status quo to e 1754. The disincentives on female labour market
participation are even increased, because the income range where additional female
earnings lead to a loss in social assistance becomes larger.8
This welfare reform will in general not be revenue neutral. We warrant a constant
level of publicly provided goods by adjusting the marginal income tax rate (on labour
and domestic capital income). The sign of the necessary tax adjustment then tells
us whether the welfare reform, in isolation, has a positive or negative revenue e¤ect.
4.2 Simulation results
Table 1 shows the labour supply e¤ects in our policy simulations. We group indi-
viduals both by household status (couples versus singles) and by skill type. Total
labour supply (TLS) is further decomposed into the participation response (PR)
and the change in hours of work, conditional on participation (AWT), i.e. the ex-
tensive versus the intensive margin. To put results into perspective, we compare the
general equilibrium outcomes (left panel of Table 1) with the outcomes of a partial
8Here, it is important that social assistance entitlement is conditioned upon total household
income.
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equilibrium setting, where both wages and unemployment rates are kept xed (right
panel). This is identical with the rst iterative step in our linked model set-up. The
second step then consists of running the general equilibrium model with this new
labour supply level.
Table 1: Labour supply e¤ects
General equilibrium Partial labour
Group model supply model
PR AWT TLS PR AWT TLS
Men in couples 1.47 -0.41 1.19 2.03 -0.18 2.03
Women in couples -0.27 -0.13 -0.52 0.57 0.21 1.04
Singles 3.01 -0.43 3.28 4.02 -0.17 4.81
Low-skilled 1.73 -0.02 2.43 2.47 0.26 3.76
Medium-skilled 1.26 -0.23 1.35 2.25 0.03 2.84
High-skilled 1.85 -0.40 1.62 1.99 -0.25 1.92
All 1.43 -0.24 1.54 2.24 0.00 2.79
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), AWT: average working time
(change in per cent), TLS: total labour supply in hours (change in per cent)
Labour supply responses in Table 1 are similar in both model versions and can be
summarised as follows:
 Participation goes up in general, which is the direct e¤ect of a reform that
makes non-participation less attractive. One exception from this general pat-
tern is married women in the general equilibrium model. The reason is inter-
action within couples due to joint taxation and cross income e¤ects. This is
analysed in more detail in Arntz et al. (2008).
 The changes in average working time are small. In the general equilibrium
version, they are negative for all groups, while in the partial model, the pattern
is not uniform.
 The change in total labour supply, which combines participation and hours-
of-work e¤ects, is positive for almost all groups. Married women in the general
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equilibrium variant are again the only exception. The participation e¤ect ob-
viously dominates.
 Classied by household type, labour supply e¤ects are the strongest for singles,
followed by married men and married women. This is not easily reconciled with
the stylised fact that the labour supply elasticity of married women is higher
than that of married men. The results can only be elucidated at the deeper
level of incentives generated by joint taxation and cross income e¤ects (see
Arntz et al., 2008).
 Labour supply e¤ects are the most re pronounced for the low skilled. This is
what one would expect given that the reform is targeted towards the lower
end of the labour market, and that the low skilled are most likely to have low
incomes.
Comparing the two panels of Table 1 shows that in general equilibrium the labour
supply e¤ect is considerably smaller than in partial equilibrium. This holds for all
groups and at both margins of labour supply (lower participation and fewer hours of
work). It is the consequence of the wage drops induced by the labour supply shock.
Together with other aggregated labour market variables, these wage reactions are
listed in Table 2.
The left panel of Table 2 is our main scenario, corresponding to the labour supply
reactions in the left panel of Figure 1. This is compared to a model variant where
the labour market regime for the high skilled is chosen identical to those of the other
labour market segments, i.e. collective wage bargaining (right panel of Table 2). The
table highlights some general e¤ects of our reform scenario on the labour markets:
 In general, a reform that encourages labour supply exerts downward pressure
on wages. On labour markets with collective wage bargaining (all cases except
the high skilled in the left panel of Table 2), two e¤ects add to the direct
consequences of an increase in labour supply. First, the trade unions fall-
back options deteriorate, since the cut in social assistance directly e¤ects the
expected income in the state of unemployment. Second, the reform increases
average marginal tax rates because those who newly enter the phase-out region
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Table 2: Labour market general equilibrium e¤ects
Competitive market Wage bargaining
for high skilled for high skilled
Low Med. High Low Med. High
skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled
Gross wage (%) -9.23 -7.26 -2.86 -10.71 -8.25 -3.98
average -6.35 -7.47
Labour supply (%) 1.48 0.68 0.84 2.34 0.90 0.84
average 0.81 1.04
Employment (%) 5.74 1.26 0.84 6.77 1.42 1.17
average 1.58 1.87
Unempl. rate (p.p.) -3.92 -0.63  -4.01 -0.57 -0.35
average -0.97 -0.99
Av. marg. tax (p.p.) 2.39 1.55 0.94 2.59 1.82 1.05
of social assistance (between e 1000 and e 1300 in Figure 2) dominate the
average. This in turn leads to wage moderation (see Koskela and Vilmunen,
1996, for the general argument).
 The unemployment rate goes down, which is also an e¤ect of the increase in
the marginal tax rate. Consequently, the increase in employment even exceeds
the positive labour supply reactions.9
To what extent do the model results depend on our assumption about the labour
market regime for the high skilled? This can be seen by comparing the two panels
of Table 2.
 In relative terms, the di¤erence is most pronounced for the high skilled. This is
what was to be expected, given that it is here where the change in the labour
market regime directly applies. However, there are also spillover e¤ects to the
other segments of the labour market.
9Di¤erences in labour supply between Tables 1 and 2 have two reasons: In Table 1, labour
supply is given in hours, whereas in Table 2 in e¢ cient (wage-weighted) hours. Labour supply in
Table 2 contains also the dampening e¤ect of the dummy household with xed labour supply.
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 With wage bargaining, the wages for the high skilled are lower, and employ-
ment is higher than in the version with a competitive labour market. This
is because, in line with the general discussion above, two additional wage-
lowering e¤ects enter: a deterioration of the fallback option for trade unions
and higher tax progressivity.
 Lower wages of the high skilled translate into lower labour tax revenue from
this group, which means a higher compensatory adjustment of the marginal
income tax rate (see Table 3). This, in turn, produces additional pressure on
the wages of the other skill groups, which is the driving force of the spillovers
to the other segments of the labour market.
Table 3: General equilibrium e¤ects on macroeconomic variables
Competitive market Wage bargaining
for high skilled for high skilled
VA share of labour (p.p.) -3.22 -3.78
Interest rate (%) 9.88 11.58
Aggregate consumption (%) 1.15 1.37
Aggregate investment (%) 1.50 1.77
GDP (%) 0.95 1.13
Income tax adjustment (p.p.) 0.25 0.36
The characteristic traits of the labour market outcomes highlighted in Table 2
are reected in a number of macroeconomic indicators, which are listed in Table 3.
The wage drops of Table 2 coincide with a lower wage bill, because labour demand
elasticities are relatively low and the increase in employment is not su¢ cient to
compensate. This means a lower value-added share of labour and a considerably
higher interest rate.10 The interest rate change induces a shift from consumption to
investment. Finally, higher employment leads to an increase in GDP. Interestingly, in
spite of this GDP gain, the reform is not self-nancing; we need a budget-balancing
increase in the general income tax of 0.25 percentage points (0.36 percentage points
10Observe that the change in the interest rate is given in per cent, not in percentage points.
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when there is wage bargaining for all skill types). The tax on capital income is lower
than on labour (particularly so because we include social security contributions in
the latter). This means that with a shift in functional income distribution in favour
of capital income, total tax revenue falls and makes a compensatory tax rate increase
necessary.
5 Sensitivity analysis
5.1 A di¤erent approach to labour demand calibration
We have invested considerable e¤ort in the calibration of the NNCES function to
empirically estimated labour demand elasticities. Nevertheless, there remains an ir-
reducible amount of arbitrariness, because we calibrate the function to a situation
where value shares are di¤erent from the sample means in the estimation (see Ap-
pendix A.4).
The detailed tables of the labour demand elasticities per sector in Appendix A.4
are useful for assessing the accurateness of the calibration. However, we can easily get
lost in the large number of di¤erent elasticity values. Therefore we try to nd a small
number of aggregate indicators that simplify comparisons across model versions.
Table 4 presents a set of macroeconomic own and cross price elasticities. These
have been generated by counterfactual model simulations where we exogenously
increase the real wage of each skill group in turn, and report the employment change,
including all general equilibrium reactions, but holding labour supply xed.11
The upper panel of Table 4 displays the elasticities generated in this way. The
following patterns can be observed: (1) The own-price elasticity of the low skilled
is considerably larger than for the two other groups. (2) Cross price elasticities are
in general small, except for a signicant substitution e¤ect of the medium-skilled
wage on the demand for the low skilled. (3) Medium and high-skilled labour are
complements at this level of aggregation and general equilibrium feedback.
11We have used the model version with wage bargaining for all three skill groups, because only
in this case we can exogenously vary the wage rate.
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Table 4: Aggregated labour demand elasticities
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
Main model version
Low skilled -1.16 0.70 0.09
Medium skilled 0.08 -0.27 -0.02
High skilled 0.02 -0.04 -0.26
Alternative calibration
Low skilled -1.23 0.70 0.06
Medium skilled 0.08 -0.18 -0.03
High skilled 0.02 -0.06 -0.15
Per cent e¤ect on labour demand of type (row) from one per cent higher wage
for type (column).
The elasticities in Table 4 allow us to decompose the general equilibrium reac-
tion from Table 2 into own and cross-price e¤ects (see Table 5). In the row Full
equilibrium e¤ect, we have the implicit general equilibrium elasticity that results
from dividing the relative labour demand change by the relative wage change. Below
in the Partial e¤ectsrows, we see the partial e¤ects that result from combining
the elasticities in Table 4 with the respective wage changes.12 Row Sumadds up
the partial e¤ects, which turn out to be a reasonably close approximation of the
general equilibrium e¤ect. Own price e¤ects dominate, but there is a considerably
negative feedback going on between the low and the medium skilled.
In the labour demand calibration of our main version, we have put special weight
on the own price elasticities (see Appendix A.4). Table 5 conrms that they quan-
titatively dominate the model outcomes, even if there are feedback e¤ects from the
other labour market segments. The trade-o¤ that we accepted in this choice is that
cross-price elasticities are less accurately reproduced. As a sensitivity check, we run
12As a reading example, take the entry in the row Medium skilledand column Low skilled.
Wages of the medium skilled go down by 7.3% (Table 2) and produce a cross price e¤ect of
7.3%0:70: Normalised with the change in the low-skilled wage itself (to be comparable with the
own-price elasticity), this gives an e¤ect of 0.55.
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Table 5: Labour demand elasticities: decomposition
Low Medium High
skilled skilled skilled
Elasticities
Full equilibrium e¤ect 5:74 9:23 = -0.62
1:26
 7:26 = -0.17
0:84
 2:86 = -0.29
Partial e¤ects
Low skilled -1.16  9:230:08 7:26 = 0.10
 9:230:02
 2:86 = 0.06
Medium skilled  7:260:70 9:23 = 0.55 -0.27
 7:26 0:04
 2:86 = -0.10
High skilled  2:860:09 9:23 = 0.03
 2:86 0:02
 7:26 = -0.01 -0.26
Sum  0:58  0:18  0:30
the labour demand calibration without any weighting, so that own and cross price
elasticities are equally important. The lower panel of Table 4 reports the conse-
quences for the aggregated labour demand elasticities, and Table 6 displays the
most important general equilibrium labour market variables in our policy scenario
(compared to the values from the main model variant, reproduced from Table 2).
The changes both in the elasticities and in the policy simulation results remain
within narrow bounds. As to the elasticities in Table 4, the contrast between the low
skilled and the other two skill groups becomes even more pronounced. Interestingly,
it is the own-price elasticities that change, whereas the cross-price elasticities remain
virtually unchanged. This backs up our choice of the weighted calibration as main
variant: Weighting leads to a better t for the own-price elasticities, while it does
not considerably distort the o¤-diagonal terms (at least not in the aggregate).
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Table 6: Sensitivity analysis 1: Alternative labour demand calibration
Main model Alternative
version LD calibration
Low skilled
Gross wage (%) -9.23 -9.22
Employment (%) 5.74 5.54
Medium skilled
Gross wage (%) -7.26 -8.68
Employment (%) 1.26 0.89
High skilled
Gross wage (%) -2.86 -2.48
Employment (%) 0.84 0.80
Aggregate consumption (%) 1.15 0.92
Aggregate investment (%) 1.50 1.30
GDP (%) 0.95 0.90
Income tax adjustment (p.p.) 0.25 0.60
5.2 International capital mobility
Labour demand elasticities have turned out to be a cornerstone for the explanation
of the simulation results. It is di¢ cult to pin down how precisely the elasticities gen-
erated in the model can be compared to empirical macro labour demand elasticities,
but contrasting the values in Table 4 with the estimations of, for instance, Symons
and Layard (1984) shows that the labour demand reactions in the model are lower
than what one could have expected.
These relatively low labour demand elasticities show up at di¤erent places in the
interpretation of the model results: (1) Changes in labour supply produce large shifts
in the wage. (2) Wage changes dominate employment changes in the determination
of total labour income. (3) This, in turn, bears on the aggregate tax revenue e¤ect
and the budget balancing tax adjustment, as we have seen in Section 4.2.
In addition to the cross-price elasticities used in the calibration, there is one
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assumption of the basic model version of Sections 4 and 5.1 that plays an important
role here. Namely, capital is internationally immobile and the capital stock does
not adjust to changes in the interest rate. This can be justied in a medium-run
perspective, because labour market adjustment can reasonably be seen as faster
than capital stock changes. However, at least in the long run, the total amount of
capital used in the economy adjusts as well, either through internal savings or capital
imports.
We therefore complement the basic version with a variant where capital is mobile
internationally, although not perfectly so. We calibrate the model to a capital import
ratio of 0:18 (French and Poterba, 1991) and an elasticity of capital imports with
respect to the domestic interest rate of 2:4 (de Mooij and Ederveen, 2001), so that
a one per cent increase in the domestic interest rate goes along with a 0.43 per cent
increase of the domestic capital stock.13 The consequences of this change for the
labour demand elasticities can be seen in the lower part of Table 7.14 As expected,
all own-price elasticities increase in absolute value. The changes are in proportion
with the value shares of the di¤erent skill types: the highest for the medium skilled,
the lowest for the low skilled (see Table 10 in the appendix for the value shares).
In addition, the three skill types become more complementary over the board. An
increase of the wage of any of the skill types drives capital out of the country, which
lowers demand for the other two skills as well.
The consequences of internationally mobile capital for the outcomes of the policy
scenario can be seen in Table 8. The stimulation of labour supply now leads to an
increase in the domestic capital stock (1.30%), while the change in the interest
rate is more moderate. This means better labour market conditions for all skill
groups. For the medium skilled, both wages and employment levels are higher than
in the version with immobile capital. The low skilled have slightly lower employment
combined with a considerably higher wage. For the high skilled, the change is most
remarkable. They now experience an increase in their wage and employment at the
same time, which is a result of the stimulation of the two other labour markets.
13We also experimented with a version where capital is perfectly mobile internationally. However,
this model variant does not allow to calculate labour demand elasticities as in Table 4, because
with international mobile capital, we cannot x all wages exogenously.
14The upper part reproduces Table 4 for comparison.
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Table 7: Capital mobility and labour demand elasticities
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
Immobile capital
Low skilled -1.16 0.70 0.09
Medium skilled 0.08 -0.27 -0.02
High skilled 0.02 -0.04 -0.26
Mobile capital
Low skilled -1.22 0.17 -0.12
Medium skilled 0.02 -0.76 -0.22
High skilled -0.03 -0.46 -0.43
Per cent e¤ect on labour demand of type (row) from one per cent higher wage
for type (column).
The macroeconomic changes are straightforward: Capital inow leads to a higher
GDP, and higher labour demand elasticities mean that the drop in the value share
of labour is smaller. Both these e¤ects contribute to higher tax revenue compared
to the case with mobile capital, which turns the budget-balancing tax adjustment
from positive to negative. The policy reform is now more than self-nancing.
6 Conclusions
We explore the consequences of implementing heterogeneous labour markets in a
consistently linked micro-macro model used to analyse tax and transfer reforms.
Three skill types of labour are distinguished, which are imperfect substitutes in
the production process. They are implemented in a set-up that uses non-separable,
nested CES functions in order to allow for an unrestricted matrix of elasticities
of substitution within the production function. We combine wage bargaining for
the low and medium skilled with a perfectly competitive labour market for the
high skilled. Both the exible substitution structure and the heterogeneity in labour
market institutions play a role in the results, but labour demand elasticities turn
25
Table 8: Sensitivity analysis 2: Intenational capital mobility
Immobile Mobile
capital capital
Low skilled
Gross wage (%) -9.23 -4.01
Employment (%) 5.74 4.58
Medium skilled
Gross wage (%) -7.26 -2.59
Employment (%) 1.26 1.75
High skilled
Gross wage (%) -2.86 0.82
Employment (%) 0.84 0.99
Interest rate (%) 9.88 2.84
Domestic capital use (%)  1.30
GDP (%) 0.95 1.60
Income tax adjustment (p.p.) 0.25 -1.36
out to be the most important drivers. This is because cross-price e¤ects signicantly
modify the own-price e¤ects, particularly as a spill-over from the medium-skilled to
the low-skilled market segment.
We use the model to simulate a reform of the German transfer system that stim-
ulates labour supply at the lower end of the wage distribution by combining lower
basic social assistance payments and a lower transfer withdrawal rate. Qualitatively,
the results are fairly robust. In all model variants considered, participation e¤ects
are positive and considerably large. They are most pronounced for singles; spouses
in couples are less a¤ected. In contrast, the e¤ects on the average working time are
small, so that changes in overall labour supply are dominated by the participation
response.
In general equilibrium, wages fall for all skill groups, but most signicantly for the
low skilled. This produces feedback and dampens labour supply reactions compared
to a partial analysis. Due to relatively low labour demand elasticities, wage drops
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translate into a lower share of labour, which in turn produces a switch in the spending
pattern from consumption to investment. Although GDP increases by about one
percent, the welfare reform, in isolation, is not self-nancing because the shift in
functional income distribution causes considerable tax revenue losses.
The consequences of the switch from wage bargaining to competitive wage for-
mation for the high skilled are concentrated on this very skill group. In a competitive
labour market setting, the wage-reducing e¤ects of higher tax progressivity and a
deterioration of the fallback position of trade unions are absent. Therefore wage
drops are less pronounced and employment gains are lower compared with collective
wage bargaining.
A sensitivity analysis shows the importance of the assumptions about capital
mobility for the results. In a model variant where we replace internationally immobile
by mobile capital, labour demand elasticities are higher. This leads to an attenuation
of the wage cuts as a consequence of the welfare reform. Both inowing capital and
a higher aggregate wage bill lead to higher tax revenue, which makes the welfare
reform self-nancing and allows the government to recycle additional tax revenue
through a general cut in the income tax.
In the context of one concrete, stylised policy reform, our results show that the
treatment of heterogeneous labour in economic models matters. Feedback and in-
teraction e¤ects turn out to be relevant, which produces a strong case for more
heterogeneous and richer models. In particular, the labour-demand cross-price elas-
ticities between the low and medium skilled are the main drivers of the results.
Interaction with the high-skilled segment is less pronounced. In this setting, a care-
ful sensitivity analysis becomes crucial, because otherwise the complex interaction
of e¤ects cannot be disentangled anymore.
There are other elds of labour market analysis where heterogeneity in skill
levels, labour market institutions and sectoral labour demand are relevant, and where
therefore a complexity level such as the one in our model is required. The labour
market consequences of sectoral changes in the trade structure and skill-specic
migration policies are possible further applications of our model.
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Appendix
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 9: Discrete weekly working hours by household types
Individual Hours Options
men, married or single without children 0 38 49
men, single with children 0 15 30 38 49
women, single 0 15 30 38 49
women, married 0 9.5 24 38 47
Table 10: Characteristics of skill groups in SOEP
Low Medium High
skilled* skilled skilled* All
Number of individuals 854 3016 761 4631
Share in dataset, unweighted (%) 18.44 65.13 16.43 100.00
Share in dataset, weighted (%) 15.82 68.24 15.94 100.00
Singles
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 38.16 32.88 37.96 34.52
Women in couples
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 37.49 33.89 23.09 32.74
Men in couples
Share in skill group, weighted (%) 24.35 33.23 38.95 32.74
Participation
Participation rate, weighted (%) 70.71 79.97 91.25 80.30
Share in total participation, weighted (%) 13.93 67.95 18.12 100.00
Average hours per worker, weighted 35.55 37.55 39.87 37.69
Share in total hours, weighted (%) 13.14 67.70 19.16 100.00
Average gross wage per hour, weighted (e) 11.70 13.38 18.37 14.12
Share in total wage bill, weighted (%) 10.89 64.17 24.93 100.00
*Low skilled: no formal education completed, high skilled: tertiary education completed
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A.2 Estimation results from the microsimulation model
Table 11: Maximum likelihood estimates for single females
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income -6.44 1.85 -3.48 0.001
Net household income^2 0.43 0.08 5.22 0.000
Net hh income X leisure 0.48 0.30 1.63 0.103
Leisure X East Germany -0.96 0.29 -3.32 0.001
Leisure X nationality 0.23 0.41 0.57 0.566
Leisure 77.59 14.10 5.50 0.000
Leisure^2 -9.96 1.80 -5.55 0.000
Leisure X age -1.11 0.31 -3.65 0.000
Leisure X age^2 0.10 0.04 2.42 0.016
Leisure^2 X age 0.59 0.12 4.83 0.000
Leisure X handicapped -0.17 0.90 -0.18 0.853
Leisure X children <6 years 4.99 0.60 8.32 0.000
Leisure X children 7-16 years 1.50 0.35 4.29 0.000
Leisure X children >=17 years -0.48 0.31 -1.53 0.127
Dummy for employment -2.13 0.25 -8.67 0.000
Number of obs. 540
Log Likelihood -636.0
Conditional logit with ve hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30,
38, 49), SOEP 1999
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Table 12: Maximum likelihood estimates for single males
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 6.76 2.73 2.48 0.013
Net household income^2 -0.019 0.10 -0.19 0.848
Net hh income X leisure -1.42 0.44 -3.21 0.001
Leisure 169.71 20.03 8.47 0.000
Leisure^2 -21.13 2.60 -8.12 0.000
Leisure X East Germany -0.05 0.33 -0.15 0.881
Leisure X nationality 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.547
Leisure X age -0.74 0.32 -2.34 0.019
Leisure X age^2 0.41 0.12 3.35 0.001
Leisure^2 X age 0.06 0.04 1.46 0.143
Leisure X handicapped 1.32 0.83 1.60 0.110
Dummy for employment -9.96 1.13 -8.78 0.000
Number of obs. 952
Log Likelihood -1286.7
Conditional logit with ve hours-of-work options (0, 15,
30, 38, 49), SOEP 1999
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Table 13: Maximum likelihood estimates for couples
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 8.95 5.11 1.75 0.080
Net household income^2 -0.003 0.26 -0.01 0.989
Net hh income X leisure of male spouse -1.46 0.42 -3.46 0.001
Net hh income X leisure of female spouse -0.43 0.38 -1.14 0.253
Net hh income X nationality -6.92 3.82 -1.81 0.070
Net hh income^2 X nationality 0.56 0.27 2.09 0.036
Net hh income X East Germany 5.50 1.87 2.94 0.003
Net hh income^2 X East Germany -0.49 0.14 -3.37 0.001
Leisure of male spouse 56.72 7.15 7.94 0.000
Leisure of male spouse^2 -4.06 0.47 -8.66 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X nationality -0.40 0.41 -0.98 0.328
Leisure of male spouse X East Germany -6.05 2.80 -2.16 0.031
Leisure of male spouse X age -0.36 0.08 -4.31 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X age^2 0.48 0.10 4.99 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X handicapped 0.76 0.72 1.06 0.290
Leisure of female spouse 79.98 7.00 11.43 0.000
Leisure of female spouse^2 -8.40 0.53 -15.77 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.27 0.40 0.67 0.501
Leisure of female spouse X East Germany -7.10 2.59 -2.74 0.006
Leisure of female spouse X age -0.39 0.09 -4.18 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X age^2 0.58 0.11 5.26 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X handicapped 0.97 0.71 1.36 0.175
Leisure of female spouse X children <6 years 4.63 0.31 14.98 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children 7-16 years 2.13 0.22 9.59 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children >=17 years -0.56 0.22 -2.56 0.011
Leisure of male spouse X Leisure of female spouse -1.50 0.55 -2.72 0.006
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.26 0.14 1.78 0.075
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X East Germany 1.03 0.70 1.47 0.142
Dummy for employment of female spouse -2.55 0.25 -10.09 0.000
Dummy for employment of both spouses 0.61 0.24 2.54 0.011
Number of obs. 1910
Log Likelihood -4186.1
Conditional logit with fteen hours-of-work options (female spouse: 0, 9.5, 24, 38,
47; male spouse: 0, 38, 49), SOEP 1999
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A.3 The budget constraint
In the context of our discrete choice set-up, the budget constraint must be deter-
mined for the nite set of hours categories, based on the German tax-benet-system.
First, gross monthly earnings are obtained by multiplying the gross hourly wage with
monthly hours of work corresponding to the respective category of weekly labour
supply. Since gross hourly wages are unobserved for those not employed, wages have
to be estimated using a Mincer-type wage regression with education, experience and
some further controls (e.g. nationality, marital status). Variables for identifying the
labour force status are the income of other household members and whether someone
is handicapped.
To obtain net earnings per month, income taxes and social security contributions
are deducted from gross monthly earnings. In general, we apply the tax and transfer
rules of the year 2000. The share in social security contributions paid by employees
amounts to 20 per cent of gross monthly earnings exceeding e 325. Income taxes are
calculated on the basis of taxable income, which is obtained by subtracting a stan-
dard deduction from gross earnings. For couple households, income tax legislation
allows for marital income splitting: According to this method, the tax schedule is
applied to half of the joint taxable income, while the resulting tax amount is doubled
to obtain total income taxes paid by the couple.
Finally, disposable monthly earnings are obtained by adding transfer payments to
net earnings. We account for unemployment benets and assistance, social assistance
and child benets, while housing benets are neglected. In Germany, unemployment
benets (UB) are available for persons who have paid contributions to the statutory
unemployment insurance for a minimum of one year. In particular, the duration of
unemployment benets depends on the unemployed persons former labour market
experience and age. The monthly amount received equals a constant fraction of
previous net monthly earnings. The replacement rate for persons without children
is 60 per cent and for persons with children 67 per cent. Unemployment benets are
not means-tested. The entitlement to UB is thus completely independent from the
labour or transfer income received by the respective spouse.
For those who do not have enough experience to obtain unemployment benets
or who have exhausted their unemployment benets, unemployment assistance (UA)
and social assistance (SA) become relevant. The replacement rate for UA payments
for persons without children is 53 per cent and for persons with children 57 per
cent. In contrast to unemployment benets, both welfare payments are means-tested,
i.e. payments are reduced if either the unemployed person or remaining household
members receive other incomes. While UA is only available for those persons who
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have exhausted their unemployment benets, eligibility for SA does not require any
former entitlement to unemployment benets. Our model takes into account the
means-tested nature of SA payments, but neglects the means-tested nature of UA
payments.
If labour supply is zero hours (voluntary unemployment), no unemployment com-
pensation is assigned. Each positive labour supply, in contrast, may result in three
di¤erent labour market states: employment (e), involuntary unemployment with
unemployment compensation (b), or involuntary unemployment with social assis-
tance (n). Owing to the static nature of the model, we are not able to determine
whether or not a person is entitled to unemployment benets. Instead, we assume
that a weighted average of UB and UA replacement rates is paid with an exogenous
probability PUC . We assume PUC to be uniform across households; it equals the
empirical share of unemployed persons receiving unemployment compensation (0.8
according to IAB, 2002). Unemployment compensation is determined on the basis of
the chosen category of hours supplied and the e¤ective replacement ratio. In a last
step, supplemental social assistance is assigned based on earnings and other transfer
income.
The distinction of three labour market states requires that the value of disposable
income for a particular working time option is calculated as an expected value.
We make the simplifying assumption that worker households do not save and use
expected disposable income as a proxy for consumption. For singles, we generate the
average of the disposable income, yd; over the three labour market states with the
respective probabilities, Pi;j; i = e; b; n; as weights:
Cj (hj;k) = E(y
d
j (hj;k)) =
X
i=e;b;n
Pi;j y
d(hj;k; i)
(For the rest of the notation, see Section 2.1). In particular, we have Pe;j = (1 uj);
Pb;j = ujPUC and Pn;j = uj(1 PUC); with uj representing (household type specic)
unemployment rates. For couples, the expected disposable income is determined by
the weighted average of disposable incomes over the 9 combinations of labour market
states:
Cj

hfj;k; h
m
j;k

= E(ydj (h
f
j;k; h
m
j;k)) =
X
i;g=e;b;n
Pi;j Pg;j y
d
j (h
f
j;k; h
m
j;k; i; g)
In the policy simulations, we use a rst-order approximation of the tax-transfer
schedule. We disturb the calculations of disposable income marginally at all relevant
points to calculate numerically the local e¤ective marginal burden of the total tax-
transfer system.
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A.4 Details of the NNCES calibration
In Table 14 we reproduce the estimation results of Falk and Koebel (1997) that
underlie our NNCES calibration. Falk and Koebel estimate full 5  5 matrices of
own and cross price elasticities for intermediate inputs (materials and energy) (I),
low-skilled labour (L), medium-skilled labour (M), high-skilled labour (H)
and capital (K) in ve sectors: Energy and Mining (E_M), Manufacturing
(MAN), Construction (CON), Trade and Transport (T_T), and Banking
and Insurance (B_I).
Through the symmetry requirement
ij
j
=
ji
i
(1)
and the share identity X
i
i = 1
we can recover the underlying value shares, i. They are summarised in the upper
part of Table 15. A complication arises through the fact that the value shares in the
AGE model do not coincide with those implicit in the estimation. The lower part of
Table 15 displays the value shares in PACE-L, including the two sectors for which
no estimation of cross-price elasticities is available. The overall t is reasonable,
however, in PACE-L, the share of high-skilled labour is uniformly higher, and there
seems to be a problem with the value share of capital in the nancial intermediation
sector. (Most probably, this latter problem is caused by the accounting of interest
rate margins, a recurrent problem in the construction of IO tables.)
Combining the demand elasticities of Table 14 with the value shares of the lower
part of Table 15 is not straightforward, because the identity (1) is violated with
the new value shares i: In the necessary adjustment, we must account both for the
homogeneity of the demand functions,X
j
ij = 0
and the negative semi-deniteness of the matrix of factor demand elasticities. We
approach this problem by a least-squares optimisation, where we minimise the rel-
ative deviations of the calibrated from the estimated demand elasticities, taking
symmetry, homogeneity and negative semi-deniteness as restrictions. In addition,
we put special weight (by a factor of ten) on the own price elasticities, because
we consider them of special importance for the simulation results. The outcome of
the optimisation is given in Table 16. This table also includes the two sectors for
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Table 14: Cross price elasticities (estimation by Falk and Koebel, 1997)
E_M MAN CON T_T B_I
I;I -0.038 -0.006 -0.107 -0.001 -0.012
I;L -0.001 0.012 0.067 -0.007 0.014
I;M 0.014 0.023 0.019 0.012 -0.010
I;H 0.008 -0.004 0.056 -0.004 0.003
I;K 0.022 -0.004 0.015 0.001 0.005
L;I -0.005 0.138 0.343 -0.021 0.097
L;L -0.256 -1.409 -1.049 -0.052 -1.244
L;M 0.107 0.128 0.075 0.017 0.366
L;H 0.222 1.062 0.422 0.042 0.789
L;K -0.067 0.078 0.207 0.014 -0.008
M;I 0.115 0.010 0.038 0.022 -0.021
M;L 0.051 0.444 0.167 0.012 0.237
M;M -0.174 -0.481 -0.118 -0.022 -0.206
M;H -0.009 0.020 -0.021 0.028 -0.006
M;K 0.017 0.006 -0.067 -0.015 -0.010
H;I 0.047 -0.161 0.257 -0.159 0.070
H;L 0.186 0.472 0.677 0.115 1.196
H;M -0.073 0.166 -0.458 0.062 -0.063
H;H -0.170 -0.418 -0.697 -0.126 -1.226
H;K 0.010 -0.058 0.221 0.108 0.100
K;I 0.094 -0.041 0.178 0.043 0.021
K;L -0.008 0.070 0.455 0.011 -0.005
K;M 0.009 0.013 -0.375 -0.037 -0.021
K;H 0.006 -0.014 0.054 0.012 0.021
K;K -0.095 -0.027 -0.313 -0.029 -0.015
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Table 15: Value shares of inputs in Falk and Koebel and PACE-L
E_M MAN CON T_T B_I AGR OSE
Falk and Koebel (1997)
I 0.708 0.663 0.552 0.592 0.527
L 0.021 0.070 0.110 0.081 0.080
M 0.090 0.168 0.276 0.245 0.265
H 0.012 0.019 0.013 0.010 0.025
K 0.169 0.079 0.050 0.073 0.102
PACE-L
I 0.514 0.679 0.551 0.421 0.353 0.515 0.318
L 0.012 0.030 0.034 0.030 0.005 0.015 0.031
M 0.182 0.182 0.258 0.328 0.120 0.132 0.276
H 0.092 0.075 0.037 0.060 0.065 0.068 0.230
K 0.200 0.033 0.119 0.161 0.457 0.270 0.145
which we do not have estimates, AGR and OSE. Here we have calculated the target
elasticities as the output-weighted average of all other sectors. In some cases, the
deviations between Tables 16 and 14 are considerable, including a few cases of sign
reversals. This warrants some caution in interpreting the simulation results.
In the sensitivity analysis (Section 5.1), we also try another labour demand
calibration, where we do not put special weight one the own price elasticities. The
results of this calibration can be seen in Table 17.
Table 18 gives an example (sector MAN) of the numerical results of the last step
in the NNCES calibration described in Section 3.1 of the main text. The results
of the other sectors vary according to the targeted labour demand elasticities, but
some aspects can be observed in general:
 Often four sub-aggregates are su¢ cient for the calibration. Only in three of
the seven sectors all ve sub-aggregates are needed.
 The calibration procedure is reasonably e¢ cient in concentrating the factors in
the sub-aggregates. Low and medium-skilled labour only appears in one nest.
 The resulting pattern of elasticities is similar in all sectors. A high elasticity
(above one) at the upper level is combined with very low elasticities (in most
cases zero) at the lower level. This pattern is not necessary, but induced by
both the starting values and the penalty function.
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Table 16: Cross price elasticities in PACE-L (least squares adjustment)
E_M MAN CON T_T B_I AGR OSE
I;I -0.045 -0.006 -0.105 -0.002 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018
I;L -0.000 0.001 0.020 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.006
I;M 0.018 0.005 0.026 0.001 0.011 0.007 0.015
I;H 0.011 0.002 0.032 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.006
I;K 0.016 -0.002 0.027 0.000 -0.005 0.004 0.003
L;I -0.006 0.018 0.323 0.001 0.001 -0.068 -0.057
L;L -0.264 -1.630 -1.071 -0.097 -1.389 -1.196 -1.202
L;M 0.228 1.290 0.449 0.041 1.453 0.978 0.963
L;H 0.128 0.259 0.079 0.034 -0.056 0.247 0.246
L;K -0.086 0.062 0.221 0.021 -0.009 0.039 0.050
M;I 0.051 0.018 0.055 0.001 0.033 0.026 0.017
M;L 0.014 0.215 0.060 0.004 0.061 0.108 0.108
M;M -0.121 -0.326 -0.116 -0.037 -0.103 -0.162 -0.161
M;H 0.019 0.089 -0.016 0.022 0.007 0.018 0.027
M;K 0.036 0.003 0.018 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.009
H;I 0.064 0.019 0.473 0.005 0.032 0.068 0.008
H;L 0.016 0.105 0.073 0.017 -0.004 0.053 0.033
H;M 0.037 0.218 -0.112 0.118 0.012 0.035 0.032
H;H -0.140 -0.339 -0.690 -0.206 -0.174 -0.288 -0.085
H;K 0.023 -0.005 0.255 0.066 0.135 0.132 0.012
K;I 0.040 -0.038 0.126 0.001 -0.004 0.008 0.006
K;L -0.005 0.057 0.064 0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.011
K;M 0.033 0.018 0.038 0.021 0.001 0.005 0.017
K;H 0.011 -0.010 0.079 0.025 0.019 0.033 0.018
K;K -0.079 -0.027 -0.307 -0.051 -0.016 -0.049 -0.053
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Table 17: Cross price elasticities in PACE-L (sensitivity analysis)
E_M MAN CON T_T B_I AGR OSE
I;I -0.050 -0.005 -0.089 -0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.025
I;L -0.000 0.008 0.025 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.010
I;M 0.017 0.003 0.021 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.009
I;H 0.009 -0.004 0.023 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003
I;K 0.025 -0.002 0.020 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.003
L;I -0.006 0.181 0.398 -0.010 0.118 0.135 0.105
L;L -0.283 -1.705 -1.299 -0.105 -1.707 -1.225 -1.208
L;M 0.255 1.294 0.571 0.072 1.098 0.859 0.867
L;H 0.115 0.151 0.083 0.023 0.499 0.178 0.172
L;K -0.082 0.079 0.247 0.021 -0.008 0.053 0.063
M;I 0.048 0.012 0.044 0.004 -0.002 0.013 0.010
M;L 0.016 0.215 0.076 0.006 0.046 0.095 0.097
M;M -0.067 -0.256 -0.060 -0.039 -0.035 -0.106 -0.109
M;H -0.010 0.026 -0.021 0.022 -0.005 0.008 0.010
M;K 0.012 0.003 -0.039 0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009
H;I 0.048 -0.036 0.343 -0.009 0.021 0.011 0.005
H;L 0.014 0.061 0.078 0.011 0.039 0.038 0.023
H;M -0.019 0.063 -0.149 0.122 -0.009 0.016 0.012
H;H -0.055 -0.082 -0.482 -0.188 -0.166 -0.104 -0.046
H;K 0.011 -0.007 0.210 0.064 0.115 0.040 0.006
K;I 0.064 -0.046 0.093 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006
K;L -0.005 0.072 0.071 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.013
K;M 0.011 0.016 -0.084 0.011 -0.001 -0.005 -0.017
K;H 0.005 -0.015 0.065 0.024 0.016 0.010 0.010
K;K -0.075 -0.026 -0.146 -0.042 -0.020 -0.014 -0.012
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Table 18: NNCES calibration for sector Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share 0.011 0.116 0.072 0.801 
Intermediates 0.014 0.116 0.072 0.798 
Low skilled labour  1.000   
Medium skilled labour    1.000 
High skilled labour  0.059 0.275 0.666 
Capital 0.041 0.086 0.084 0.790 
n 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
Y 7.072
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